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SCHOOL VIOLENCE: THE CALL FOR A CRITICAL
THEORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

Karen L. Michaelis*

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the
"other" in literature, helping us to understand how enemies
are created, who is identified as "the enemy," and why enemies
are necessary to society. The literature on enemies intersects
several fields from psychology, sociology, and philosophy, to
groups within the legal academy. Educator Paolo Freire not
only championed oppressed people, he sought to empower the
oppressed by exposing the complementary roles played by both
the oppressed and their oppressors. Similarly, sociologist
James Aho described a process through which we can better
understand the social construction of enemies and the corresponding participation in that process by social insiders. In his
1
book, Just Stories: How the Law Embodies Racism and Bias,
Thomas Ross explores the way the judicial system categorizes
litigants as a means of reaching rational, objective, and thereby
just decisions in particular cases involving society's outsiders
such as the poor, racial minorities, women, and children. He
concludes that the creation of any categories, based on perceived differences of one group by another group embodying the
social norm, on the surface, leads to predictability, rationality,
and certainty in the law, and keeps power from the powerless.
Ross describes a process whereby enforcers of the law are
the first to determine if, or when, a law has been broken, ena* Karen I. Michaelis, Ph.D 1988, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. 1989, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Dr. Michaelis is an Assistant Professor at Washington
State University in the Department of Educational Leadership and Counseling Psychology.
1. THOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS
1996.
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bling the enforcer (state authority) to use discretion in deciding
under what circumstances a rule will be enforced. The use of
discretion to decide when an authority figure will enforce a rule
is shaped and colored by the authority figure's knowledge, experience, and biases. If the authority figure believes a member
of a particular group, based on race, ethnicity, gender, or age, is
usually guilty by his or her mere presence, then the authority
figure will be more likely to target individuals who are mem2
bers of those groups, even for minor infractions.
Feminist legal theorists, such as Deborah Rhode, Ann
Scales, Linda McClain, and Patricia J. Williams, and critical
race theorists such as Richard Delgado, Francisco Valdez, and
Mari Matsuda have described in vivid detail the effect of a judicial system that Lawrence Tribe has described as "deeply out
of sync with" our changing perceptions of the relationship
3
among law, the state, and society." Feminist legal theorists
and critical race theorists have long argued for a more contextualized approach that takes into account that judicial decisions change litigants' reality.
Feminist legal theorists advocate for a judicial system that
looks at a legal issue from multiple perspectives in an effort to
find the best solution to legal conflicts, taking into account the
unique facts in specific cases. Such an approach would not ensure a particular result; rather this approach would encourage
judges to consider the impact legal decisions will have on the
4
structure of society. A feminist justice model focuses on the social context within which the conflict arose. But unlike the traditional justice model that focuses on individual rights and the
common good as separate and distinct interests that always coexist in tension with each other, the feminist justice model
rests on the presumption that the resolution of any conflict will
be just if the multiple and varied perspectives of all those affected by the decision are placed in the relevant social context.
It is the coupling of the interests of the many individuals in a
community with the social context that illuminates the path to
the most just result.

2. For a diagram representing the process described by Ross see Karen Michaelis, Searching the Enemy: A Legal Construct of' the Other, 5 JOURNAL FOR A JUST AND
CARING EDUCATION 14 (April1999).

3. Lawrence Tribe, The Curvature of' Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
4. See generally id. at 1.
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Within the traditional justice model, individual rights and
the community good are viewed as mutually exclusive interests, so that justice is viewed from only one perspective at a
time. Such an approach separates the individual from the social context and leads to results that reflect only one perspective-that of the dominant culture-which is based on the similarities among its members, thus alienating and ostracizing
those who are different. Under the traditional justice model, it
is not difficult to see how some individuals and groups would
feel that the system treats them unfairly.
Critical race theorists have argued that a judicial focus on
the differences between members of minority groups and the
social norm places too much emphasis on the importance of difference, particularly in circumstances where differences based
on race, for example, tend to obscure judicial attempts to preserve and perpetuate existing power structures. We have
learned from feminist legal scholars and critical race theorists
that legal decisions are made interactively within a social context. When a judge sees himself or herself as part of the "rele1
vant 'social space,"'' then the judge must acknowledge that the
state plays a part in perpetuating the structure of society that
6
keeps outsiders helpless and vulnerable. Children subjected to
the juvenile justice system suffer injustices and prejudices
similar to those experienced by women and minorities as well
as members of other excluded groups.
For it is the most vulnerable, the most forgotten, whose perspective is least akin to that of the lawmaker or judge or bureaucrat and whose fate is most forcefully determined by the
law's overall design-by its least visible, most deeply embed7
ded gaps and reflections.
Aspects of both feminist legal theory and critical race theory
can be readily transferred to a critical theory of juvenile justice,
but there is no political group comprised of members of the
group of juveniles who could advocate for a new approach to juvenile justice. Therefore, there is no political pressure on society or the justice system to force a change in the way juveniles
are treated by the justice system that truly reflects the reality
of juveniles from their perspective. How, then, can children ex-

5. ld. at 38.
6. See generally Tribe, supra note 3, at 13-14.
7. See id. at 13.
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pect to be treated fairly by a justice system that ignores therealities of children?
I will argue in the following sections, that juveniles are the
most vulnerable of all individuals who come into contact with
the justice system because of their real or implied powerlessness and because of the bias inherent in the stories about the
juvenile told over and over by those in the media, government
agencies such as schools, and ultimately, the courts. The stories incorporating judicial bias and prejudice ensure that decisions affecting the lives of juvenile offenders appear rational,
just, and inevitable. In our hierarchical society, juveniles have
virtually no power to overcome the bias and irrationality of
school disciplinary procedures, much less legal decisions. Because we do not consider the reasons why juveniles end up as
criminals, we fail to consider the perspective of the juvenile in
the process. Therefore, we have no right to expect juveniles to
change their behavior to fit into a society that refuses to protect
them when they are victimized, but is all too eager to punish
them when they behave in an inevitably violent manner, frequently in reaction to unjust decisions and life situations. First,
I will argue that, according to feminist theorists, women continue to be subjugated by the political and social "norm,"
women being an important "other" in literature. Second, I will
compare this subjugation of women to juveniles, who are even
worse off in societal acceptance than are women. This will constitute the bulk of my argument.

II. A DISTRIBUTIVE MODEL OF JUSTICE
Iris Young presents a compelling picture of the shortcomings of the existing model of justice based on a distributive
paradigm. Young argues that a definition of justice based on
the distribution of goods keeps the focus on "things, income,
8
and jobs," but "fails to brin~ social structures and institutional
contexts under evaluation." Through its emphasis on fairness,
the distributive paradigm of justice promotes individualism

8. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE. 24 (1990).
9. The problem with modern political theory is that it accepts, outright, existing
institutional structures as well as the notion that those institutional structures should
be evaluated by normative criteria. Acceptance of institutional structures, in turn, "reduce[s] political subjects to a unity and ... value[s] commonness or sameness over
specificity and difference." Id. at 20.
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through the social construct of community. The purpose of
community is to preserve individual identity (insofar as it does
not interfere with the collective identity of the community as a
whole) among members of the social group/community where
sameness equals equality. There is a negative side of community, however, for those who cannot meet the criterion of sameness. Such individuals present a threat to the community's
10
identity. Difference, Young argues, is viewed as opposition to
the community's identity, and therefore difference is viewed as
deviance that leads, in turn, to a devaluation of those individuals identified as different. In rejecting the distributive paradigm of justice, Young argues for a model of~ustice that focuses
1
on the effects of domination and oppression.
Young identifies three issues that are ignored by distributive theories of justice: 1) decision making structures and pro13
14
cedures;12 2) division of labor; and 3) culture. The combination of these three elements leads to the domination and
oppression, at an institutional level, of those individuals or
groups viewed as different. As long as domination and oppression are institutionalized, there can be no movement toward a
system based on social justice requiring a comparison of alternative patterns and a determination of which pattern is the
. t 15
mas t JUS
.

III.

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FEMINIST CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY

The sameness/difference debate that has occupied a significant place in feminist legal theory is a useful component in the

10. !d. at 12
11. "Such a shift brings out issues of decisionmaking, division of labor, and culture that bear on social justice but are often ignored in philosophical discussions. It
also exhibits the importance of social group differences in structuring social relations
and oppression; typically, philosophical theories of justice have operated with a social
ontology that has no room for a concept of social groups." !d. 3.
12. Decision making structures and procedures originate within corporate and
legal structures. !d. at 23.
13. "[C]oncerns the definition of the occupations themselves." !d. at 23.
14. "[l]ncludes symbols, images, meanings, habitual comportments, stories ...
through which people express their experience and communicate with one another." !d.
at 23.
15. "Rational reflection on justice begins in a hearing, in heeding a call, rather
than in asserting and mastering a state of affairs, however ideal. The call to 'be just' is
always situated in concrete social and political practices that precede and exceed the
philosopher." !d. at 5.
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construction of a critical theory of juvenile justice. But prior to
exploring the significance in law of the sameness/difference debate, it is necessary to define the appropriate approach or theoretical frame within which notions of sameness/difference can
be discussed in a meaningful way.
Part of the sameness/difference discussion must include the
role language plays in perpetuating a legal system that easily
justifies existing legal doctrines that effectively silence and/or
punish particular identifiable groups of people as outsiders,
thereby justifying their oppression. Feminist legal theorists
such as Frug, Minow, Bartlett, and Rhode have used postmodernism and poststructuralism as the means by which to study
the language used by the legal system to construct the social
16
landscape that privileges some and oppresses others.
Language is the vehicle through which the legal system
constructs the social reality where justice is done. How an
event or the participants are described or characterized
throughout the judicial process (the description and characterization of each party begins with the first telling of the event
even before the parties find their way into court) frequently determines who will prevail, because with each retelling, a social
or moral value is placed on the interests of each party. The
symbols of language are taught to us early on, and those symbols shape what we see-what we perceive reality to be. As
symbols of meaning, words create a mood and characterize
people. Therefore, the individual who shapes the story gives it
meaning through the choice of words used to describe the
events. The words chosen, then, will determine and construct
reality at a given moment.
As some feminist legal theorists have pointed out, the notion that justice is based on equality has led to universality
with an emphasis on universal norms as the standard by which
justice is measured. The universalist view that a theory of jus-

16. Frug defines postmodernism as: "a certain style characterized by wordplay; it
is a way of seeing language as an agent of social construction; and it is a way of seeing
the human subject as decentered, polymorphous, and indeterminate" in Barbara Johnson, Commentary: Response, The Postmodern in Feminism. 105 HARV. L. REV. 1076
(1992). Minow states that "Postmodern work ... explores the multiplicity of meanings
within language itself." Martha Minow, Incomplete Correspondence: An Unsent Letter
to Mary Joe Frug. 105 HARV. L. REV. 1096, 1099-1100 (1992). Poststructuralism "refers
to theories of interpretation that view meanings as a cultural construction mediated by
arrangements of language or symbolic form." Deborah Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 620 n. 8 (1990).
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tice must necessarily be directed toward the common good of
citizens within the community as a whole "tend[s] to exclude
women or to make women's claims appear deviant when meas17
ured against established norms." A universalist approach also
tends to discount the significance and/or "importance of differ18
ences among social groups" by elevating "social and legal
19
practices" to the status of universal norms when in fact those
20
practices are based on partial norms. Ultimately, the question
comes down to what difference does difference make in the so21
cial and political scheme? Focusing on this question should
lead to a shift in our thinking about the concept of inequality.
The shift would allow us to explore inequality as "systemic
22
subordination," thus allowing us to comprehend the inherent
oppression certain groups suffer within the existing social and
political realms. Much feminist critical legal theory urges adoption of a feminist perspective to illustrate how significantly notions of gender have invaded the underlying assumptions of
how society is structured and, in turn, how those assumptions
have led to legal structures as well as legal decisions which
have severely restricted the lives and rights of women.
By accepting as the norm the idea that moral value stems
from rationality and objectivity, it is not difficult to conclude
that women have much less moral value because in a gendered
society, women are relegated to the private sphere where
women's lives revolve around home and childbearing. Society
restricts views of women to their sexuality and fragile emotional nature making women unsuitable for participation in the
public sphere where decisions about how society will function
are made. Such decisions are based on the precept that rationality and objectivity ensure a just society.
Alternatively, men move in both private and public spheres.
In the public sphere, men assume a rationality and objectivity
that allows them to place a high value on their own moral
17. CASS

R. SUNSTEIN, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 6 (1990).

18. !d.
19. !d.
20. !d.
21. "Another consequence is to suggest that the question of equality is not
whether there are 'differences' between the two groups subject to comparison but is instead what sort of political and social difference the actual difference makes." !d. at 56.
22. "[T]he ultimate goal should be to develop an understanding of inequality as
the systemic subordination of certain social groups." !d. at 6.
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worth, a moral worth constructed and validated in the private
sphere where men assert their authority over their wives and
children in a microcosm of public society where their conception of a just society prevails. Extending that perspective from
the private sphere to the public sphere, men assume they are
capable of determining the best, most just rules governing all
social behavior. The presumption is that the rational, male
perspective encompasses and reflects all perspectives fairly and
equally so that men are uniquely situated to determine which
interests have the highest moral worth and therefore, are necessary to achieve the common good. Because men are rational,
decisions for the common good necessarily are made by men.
23
Some relational feminists argue that rationality and objectivity do not lead to just decisions because decisions that ignore
the context in which an event arises, as well as the perspective
of each of the participants, cannot be just. Likewise, decisions
reflecting the decision maker's perspective alone cannot be just
because the decision maker's bias and prejudices interfere with
the ability to have a complete knowledge of each of the multiple
perspectives of the parties involved.
The tendency in law to separate reason and objectivity from
feelings and subjectivity, thereby reifying abstraction over context, has resulted in a legal system that ignores individual stories situated within specific contexts and governed by the facts
of particular lives. The result is that, in many instances, individuals subjected to, restricted, and defined by norms based on
the characteristics of people who share no similarities with
them cannot avoid future interactions with a legal system that
ignores the realities of their lives while forcing the individual
to comply with a norm that simply does not fit. While this approach has a severely negative impact on women, it has an
even more devastating impact on juveniles, who enjoy even

"See generally, e.g. KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, Sexual Divisions in Law (1985); SUSAN
MOLLER OKIN, JUS'riCE, Gender and the Family (1989); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth
Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 117 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Carole
Pateman, The Sexual Contract (1988); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender
Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1989) [hereinafter Dowd, Work and Family];
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Legal Status of Families, 77 CORm;LL L. REV. 992 (1992);
Jane E. Larson, The Sexual Injustice of the Traditional Family, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
997 (1992); Francis Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
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lower status than do women.
IV. THE VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC

Public opinion supports the conclusion that American teenagers have become increasingly violent in recent years. That
opinion has been shaped by the media, government, and "pri24
vate youth management interests." According to Michael
5
Males,~ our collective recollection about the peace and tranquillity of the behavior of teens in years gone by gives the impression that the behavior of the teens of yesteryear was benign. In comparison, today's teens are aggressive and violent.
Males states:
Back when we were kids, the standard grownup headshaker goes, it was a little running in the hall, talking
out of turn, and neighborhood pranks. Then every year,
the kids got a little worse and a little worse, and bam ...
now it's homeroom crack carnage and schoolyard shootouts.26
But Males disagrees with the prevailing public opinion that
today's teens are much more violent than teens of the 1960s
and 1970s. Males contends that the current anti-youth movement has been fabricated by government officials and private
mental health organizations motivated not by an interest in so27
cietal causes of teen violence and aggression, but by profit.
Further, Males contends that national statistics have been
manipulated to misrepresent the incidence of teen crime, unwed births, and deaths due to drunk driving. Both Males and
28
Humes agree that more children are being arrested for violent
crimes than ever before, and "a majority of youth in jails, prisons, and detention facilities [are] nonwhite, [and] incarcerated
29
under criminal laws." Both Males and Humes agree that the

24. "From the early 1970s ... to the early 1980s, decreases ranging from 5 percent
to 80 percent were recorded in adolescent murders, violent crime rates, self-destructive
and self-inflicted deaths, violent deaths in general ... , and drug deaths." Mike A.
Males, THE SCAPEGOAT GENERATION: AMERICA'S WAR ON ADOLESCENTS 29 (1996).
25. MIKE A. MALES, FRAMING YOUTH: 10 MYTHS ABOUT THE NEXT GENERATION
(1999).
26. Id. at 28.
27. See MALES, supra note 25.
28. EDWARD HUMES, No MATTER HOW LO!JD I SHOUT: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF
JlNENILE COURT (1996).
29. MALES, supra note 25, at 31.
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public, supported by newer, harsher laws, is demanding a "get
30
tough" approach to juvenile justice. Humes: captures the growing sentiment when he states:
The system needs to be tougher on kids, imprisoning
them longer, focusing more on protecting the public and
less on protecting a youthful innocence that no longer
seems to exist. For this group, the fix consists of pushing
the juvenile justice system back toward the nineteenthcentury model, when adults and children were treated
exactly the same. Juvenile criminals are more
sophisticated and less remorseful than previous
generations, prosecutors seem to agree. Treating
today's child criminals differently from adults ... "flat
31
out isn't working."

As public pressure increases on the justice system to make
society safe from teen violence, government agencies seek to
protect the financial interests of adults and the mental health
system. The more the media interpret statistics in ways that
make it appear that today's teens are more uncontrollable and
violent than past generations of teens (distorting the pervasiveness of teen violence by reporting only the most sensational
teenage outbursts), the more we begin to view teens as deviant
and morally unworthy of redemption. When the separation into
"us" and "them" is accomplished, we then feel justified in loosening the restraints on state agents to do whatever is necessary to curb teen violence, while we concurrently create persuasive arguments against the need for strong protection of the
Constitutional rights of juveniles. This process begins early. In
fact, long before the juvenile justice system even becomes
aware of many juveniles, school officials already have begun to
shape the lives of many juveniles who will one day graduate
from the school disciplinary system into the juvenile justice
system, ultimately finding their way into the adult criminal
justice system.
In some instances, schools work in conjunction with the juvenile courts, beginning with truancy proceedings to ensure an
early identification of potential juvenile offenders and a smooth
transition of violent and aggressive teens from school discipli-

30. HUMES, supra note 29.
31. !d. at 166, quoting Peggy Berkstrand, Assistant District Attorney, Los Angeles.
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nary proceedings to juvenile court proceedings. Sometimes the
relationship between the schools and the juvenile court is so intertwined that the juvenile court judge uses the school as part
of the weapon of punishment by ordering the juvenile to attend
school on a regular basis. If the juvenile fails to attend school
regularly, because he or she soon realizes that the system is
overloaded and there is no one available to enforce the judge's
order, the court then uses the teen's truancy as an indication of
the teen's disrespect for the court's authority, thereby justifying a harsher sentence when the juvenile court judge finally
must sentence an ever increasingly violent teen to real jail
time.:Jz
Unfortunately for many juvenile offenders, it is the breakdown of the system at the earliest stages that leads to the creation of a hard-core juvenile offender. This occurs when a first
offender fails to follow the judge's order and nothing happens.
There is no negative consequence that follows the juvenile's
noncompliance because there is no one who actively monitors
33
the juvenile to ensure compliance.
Just as small children test their parents to determine the
boundaries of acceptable behavior in the home, teens often test
those same boundaries in a broader societal context with the
adult authority figures who exert control over them. The goal
for small children not only is to learn what mom and dad expect them to do in various situations, but small children also
seek their parents' attention, either good or bad. If no moral
structure is provided, the negative attention-seeking behavior
escalates until someone takes a stand and forces the child either to correct the negative behavior or to take responsibility
for the results of the negative behavior.
Children who end up under court supervision frequently
come from homes where either or both of the above conditions
have not been met. Children from all socio-economic backgrounds require such boundaries, but wealth and privilege do
not insure that 1) parents know how to teach their children ac-

32. ld.
33. "[Klids at every level of the system know the Juvenile Court often can't touch
them. 'You talk to youngsters, ... and they tell you, repeatedly, that they got away with
so much~that they commit crimes, but aren't arrested, or if they are arrested, when
they are brought into court, nothing happens. That's common knowledge. If you expect
that, you can get away with a helluva lot, that affects your behavior. You start making
the kinds of calculations this boy in Juvenile Hall was making.'" I d. at 165.
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ceptable behavior; or that 2) parents will pay attention to their
children. The difference wealth and privilege make becomes
clear when a child from a family considered to be successful,
educated, or wealthy presents problems at school or in juvenile
court. The outcome is usually less severe or punitive than the
punishment for a child from single-parent, low-income, undereducated families. The variable treatment, based on wealth, illustrated by Humes as he recounts the story of a young AsianAmerican juvenile appearing in juvenile court with a private
attorney, paid for by the juvenile's family rather than the customary public defender who is provided by the court at no cost
34
to the defendant, vividly demonstrates how some children are
saved and others are sacrificed. Two questions arise when this
process is carefully examined. First, how are particular juveniles selected for each category, redeemable or expendable?
Second, why should certain juveniles be severely penalized
when the system never paid them any attention when they
were victims of an abusive family, an uncaring society, and an
overwhelmed social service system prior to their reclassifica35
tion as perpetrator?
The juvenile court is the parent of last resort to many juveniles today. Similar to a nuclear family, there also are two
functions that juvenile courts must fulfill as parents of last resort. The first, arguably most important function of the juvenile
court, is to teach children what the rules of society are so they
may grow up to be independent, functional adults. Many juveniles are first introduced to the juvenile justice system as
young children who have been abused, neglected, or abandoned
by their parents. Humes describes the disappointment one

34. "Judge Dorn is nodding his approval at Oh, a perfectly coifed private practitioner from downtown LA hired by the family. She is a rarity in ,Juvenile Court, where
the vast majority of kids get overworked court-appointed lawyers paid by the state,
since most children are legally indigent and their parents cannot be forced to pay for
their legal bills, even the ones that can afford to. Oh has already impressed the judge
by filing extensive written motions, affidavits, and favorable psychological profile of
John labeling him an ideal candidate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system (an expert opinion paid for by John's parents). All this had been neatly compiled in a bound
volume with elaborate indexed tabs-again, a rarity. The assembly-line crush of cases
is so great that most kids are lucky if they meet their lawyers before going to court,
much less benefit from carefully researched pleadings ... [t]hose who walk into Juvenile Court like Oh, ignoring the peeling paint and futility, treating it instead as if it
were the most important forum in the land, find a certain edge in Judge Dorn's court."
Id. at 100.
35. Id.; see generally, MALES, supra note 25.

299]

A CRITICAL THEORY OF JlJVENILE JUSTICE

311

young juvenile suffered when he realized that, as a victim of
abuse and neglect, he did not qualify for the court's protection
because, in these cases, often the court's goal is to preserve the
family unit. The child entered the juvenile justice system in the
hope of finding protection from a violent or nonexistent home
life. Instead, the lesson the child quickly learned was that the
file containing his life story, recounting the abuse he had suffered, led not to protection but to additional abuse when he was
returned home and later placed in foster care where the abuse
36
and neglect continued. The severity of that disappointment
fueled deep resentment and mistrust of the system despite the
court's rhetoric of acting in the best interests of the child.
The second function of the juvenile court is to punish juveniles who violate the law. The original purposes of the juvenile
court were to correct and rehabilitate juveniles. Both categories
of youths, abused or neglected children, and juvenile offenders,
were viewed as young people in need of protection and rehabilitation. We currently are failing children in both categories by
responding to the demands of adults. On one hand, parents
demand the right to raise their children without state interference. On the other hand, adult members of society demand protection from young criminals. In either case, juvenile courts are
caught between their two functions, protection and rehabilitation, with no perfect solutions on the horizon.
The second lesson juveniles learn in the juvenile justice system is that at some magic moment, the juvenile victim of abuse
37
is transformed into a juvenile offender. When that transformation occurs, the juvenile offender gets a glimpse of the second way juvenile courts ignore the needs of children. Slowly,
the lesson is internalized, and juvenile courts are overwhelmed
with a never-ending flow of cases. If the crime is not serious,
36. "The respected child psychiatrist who evaluated George said the boy would
respond well in a stable, structured environment-something the Juvenile Court, in all
the years it controlled George's fate, never managed to give him." HUMES, supra note
29, at 108.
37. "Despite its brevity, there was a hidden subtext to George's first hearing as an
accused delinquent. It had transformed him-in the eyes of the law, at least-from a
child in danger to a dangerous child. No one blamed the nameless bureaucrats who
took an A-B student and sent him to a home troubled by drugs; there is no such accountability in the system. No one asked how a ward of the court could become a gang
member without anyone noticing. Only George was held accountable. His status as a
300 ward had ended, his file in dependency court stamped with one large red word:
'Terminated.' Officially, he was no longer a victim, he was a criminal, and that is how
he would be treated forevermore." !d. at 112-13.
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then the juvenile court judge merely goes through the official
ceremony of noting the incident, and admonishing the juvenile
to go to school and stop offending. The judge may even threaten
more severe sanctions if the juvenile fails to comply with the
judge's order and returns to court a second time. When nothing
happens if the juvenile doesn't do as the judge ordered, the juvenile quickly learns that there really is no one actively monitoring his/her activities or compliance with the order. The juvenile begins to think that the juvenile court judge doesn't
really have the power to interfere in any significant way with
the juvenile's life. As a result, the juvenile pushes this boundary, ultimately finding his/her way back into juvenile court,
frequently in front of the same judge whose orders have been
disregarded. This routine continues with the judge imposing
more and more sanctions on the juvenile for failing to comply in
the first instance. The cycle, however, comes to an abrupt halt
as soon as the juvenile commits a serious crime in which some18
one is seriously injured or killed.:
At that moment, the juvenile court takes notice of the juvenile as if for the first time, except it is not the first time. Now
the juvenile's file gains a prominence worthy of the court's attention, and the juvenile's status as a victim of abuse over the
years of childhood is recast as the cause of the current situation, and the inevitability of the juvenile's perpetrator status is
39
supported by the earlier documentation.
Severe punishment
is justified based on the rhetoric of inevitability.

V. DIFFERENCE AS DEVIANCE
By focusing on difference and equating difference with deviance, the legal system can continue to force individuals to
submit to existing universal norms as the system seeks to
shape individuals to fit the existing social mold. For feminists,
40
the problem with a "modern or masculine jurisprudence" is
that an "ethic of justice," with its emphasis on individual rights
41
and communal rules, ignores the lives and narratives of a
significant number of individuals. Lawyers and judges within
38. See id.
39. !d.
40. Linda McClain, Atomistic Man Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (1992).
41. !d.
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such a jurisprudence seem not even to be aware that there are
other stories or lives that require voice. Once judges and lawyers are made aware of others who differ from the norm, such a
jurisprudence does not have a mechanism to adjust the application of the law to enhance flexibility which would accommodate individual differences based on a variety of factors. They
simply cannot see from the perspective of the "others."
Additionally, applications of an ethic of justice have been
interpreted to mean "that the person in the original position is
self-referential and in perspective taking assumes that all per42
sons are like that very self." A feminist interpretation of the
way the person in the original position responds is "to think
from the perspective of everybody, in the sense of each in
4
turn." :J Thus, the existing legal system, based on rationality
and objectivity, excludes anyone who differs from the person in
the original position.
Decision-makers in the existing legal system presume that
their decisions are fair to all because their decisions are based
on their own lives and experiences which make their decisions
appear fair and just. Those differing from the person in the
original position have virtually no chance for fairness because
decision-makers cannot imagine what the lives of the "others"
44
are like. As Ross illustrates repeatedly throughout his book,
judges bring their own experiences and biases to their decisions. Those experiences and biases invade their decisions in
ways that appear rational and objective from the perspective of
the decision-maker. Those rational and objective decisions
make sense only where those acted upon are members of an excluded class. If the race, gender, or age of the one acted upon is
changed to that of the dominant group, the rationality and objectivity of the result quickly unravels because the underlying
assumption that it is legitimate for certain classes of people to
be subjected to more supervision and control than other classes
of people disappears.
One especially potent example in Ross's book is that of a
welfare mother who finds herself in court facing termination of
her AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) benefits
because she refused to allow a social worker, who arrived un42. Id. at 1206-07.
43. ld. at 1207 (quoting S. M. Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice, 99 ETHICS 229, 244 (1989)).
44. Ross, supra note l.
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announced, entry into her home, ostensibly to check the continued eligibility of the woman to receive AFDC benefits as
well as the welfare of the woman's children. Ross points out
that because the woman is on welfare, the state assumes that it
is justified in monitoring her life without notice, regardless of
the inconvenience to the woman. Using the tool of rhetoric, the
court "transforms things into their opposites. Difficult choices
become obvious, change becomes continuity. Real human suf45
fering vanishes as we conjure up righteousness."
The truth of Ross's words becomes clear when he makes one
small, but significant change in the facts. Ross asks whether
the judge or society at large would continue to justify the actions of the social worker if she attempted to check, unannounced, and in the middle of the night, on the welfare of children in a white, middle class neighborhood. The righteousness
of the state's actions quickly loses its rationale simply by
changing the characteristics of the affected family.
The righteousness of the judge's approach in the welfare
case is made to appear normal because such a comparison is
never made. The legal narrative crafted by judges is
46
"place[d] ... in a particular place and time." From there
47
judges select which parts of the story to tell. Selective exclusion of certain details, which, if included in the story, would
cast a different, possibly more balanced, view of the events, allows judges to structure the reality of the specific events which,
in turn, both justifies the specific decision and perpetuates the
underlying assumptions about particular groups of people.
This is the same process of creating an enemy described by
48
James Aho in his study of white supremacists in Idaho and
Washington who target certain individuals based on particular
characteristics that generate hatred in the white supremacists
triggering violence toward those targeted. The process of creat-

45. ld. at 20.
46. Id. at 26.
47. Id. at 26.
48. JAMES ALFRED AHO, THIS THING OF DARKNESS: A SOCIOLOGY OF THE ENEMY.

(1994); See also, Karen Michaelis, Searching the Enemy: A Legal Construct of the Other,
5 JOURNAL FOR A JUST AND CARING EDUCATION, 209-32 (1999) (applying Aho's model
for constructing enemies to the actions taken by public school officials who search students labeled as troublemakers. When students challenge the actions of school officials
in the legal arena, judges have frequently justified the behaviors of school officials in
much the same way the court justified the actions of the social worker in Ross's example of the welfare mother.)
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ing enemies, as I have described elsewhere, also applies to the
actions of school officials who target certain classes of students
49
for intrusive searches or other punitive actions.
According to Ross, the process begins with the "creation of
0
[an] abstraction."fi The abstraction allows us to view those des51
ignated as "different from the rest of us," and to manufacture
generalizations about the moral worth of any group labeled as
2
"different."fi We accomplish the division between "us" and
"them" specifically to distinguish between our normalcy and
3
their deviance.fi Ross explains that in law there are certain
rhetorical devices used by judges for the purpose of creating an
abstraction to justify a legal outcome that would not be considered rational given the social context within which the conflict
to be resolved arose.
Ross demonstrates the process of enemy construction in a
story about racism using the rhetorical themes of "white inno56
55
cence,"fi4 "special favorites," and "self imposed stigma."
These rhetorical themes of racism are carefully woven into the
legal system. They also are themes widely accepted by members of American society. These themes create a "paradox of ir57
rationality and normalcy" at the heart of "unconscious racism,"58 which leads to a conclusion that oppression based on
59
an individual's difference is natural or inevitable. As applied
to the discipline of public school students, courts accept the
precept that if parents have the right to discipline their children to protect them from harm, then school officials, standing
in the place of the parents during the school day, have the right
to discipline and/or protect students as well. This is especially
49. AHO, supra note 49.
50. Ross, supra note 1, at 57.
51. ld.
52. ld. at 58.
53. "The first step, the creation of the abstraction 'the poor,' is an easily overlooked yet powerful part of the rhetoric of poverty. We are so used to speaking of the
poor as a distinct class that we forget the rhetorical significance of doing so. By focusing on the single variable of economic wealth and then drawing a line on the wealth
continuum, we create a class of people who are 'them,' not us." Ross, supra note 1, at
57-58.
54. !d. at 21.
55. !d. at 27.
56. !d. at 30.
57. Id. at 52.
58. I d.
59. !d. at 27.
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true for those students characterized as troublemakers. In juvenile court, judges select rhetorical themes that are longaccepted by society generally. Such rhetorical themes as: "juvenile villains," where juveniles are characterized as out of control, violent, and dangerous; and "adult innocence," where the
actions of school officials are justified as necessary to the preservation of order in the educational environment and for the
protection of students and adults from juvenile villains establishes the necessity for the expansion of juvenile court authority as well as the expansion of the authority of school officials
that follows.
While the doctrine of in loco parentis as applied in the public school context was terminated by the Supreme Court in New
60
Jersey v. T. L. 0., courts continue to apply this doctrine (usually under the guise of the school official's duty to preserve the
educational environment) to children who enter the juvenile
justice system, resulting in the justification of actions by school
officials that parents might not take (i.e. searching their children and then turning over evidence of crime to the police). As
a result, students are subjected to a court system more concerned about controlling children than salvaging their lives. A
child who comes under the province of the juvenile court is
forced to live with the court's decision regarding the child's future and from which the child has no escape.
When the court bases its decisions on presumptions about
the life circumstances of an individual who appears in juvenile
court and that individual's potential for successful transition
into adult society, the biases of the judges will have a significant impact on the outcome in specific cases. When the judge is
swayed by statistics or news stories that portray juveniles as
violent and out of control, then the judge is more likely to treat
the juveniles who appear before him or her more harshly. However, this may unfairly penalize most juveniles who enter the
61
juvenile justice system because, according to Males, the reliance on statistics by government agencies and the media, has
led to a distorted and overly bleak picture of the rate of violence among teens. Thus, the prevailing story about teens in
America is that they are out of control and supremely violent,
and if government agencies are not given the authority to con-

60. New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U. S. 325 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
61. MALES, supra note 25.
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trol teens, then society as we know it will be destroyed.

VI. THE ROLE OF RHETORIC AND THE USE OF MAGIC
The narratives we bring to the formal rules of law are not
just haphazardly chosen, they are inevitably connected with a
vision of the world to come. Moreover, this world to come is al62
ways one we imagine to be just and righteous.
Judges, as well as others in positions of power, occupy exalted positions in relation to the majority of people. Their exalted positions give them the power to tell the rest of us what
the law is; what we as a people should value and protect. They
63
accomplish this through rhetoric plus a little magic. "The
simple truth is that law cannot be coherently constructed without a redemptive vision. The question for us is, which vision
64
shall we pursue?" The choice that follows, then, is whose interests shall the law redeem? That choice is made when the
judge identifies the rhetorical theme(s) which sets the course
the judicially constructed narrative will follow. The ~~ml is to
make the rhetorical theme "intellectually coherent." " To ensure the acceptance of the rhetorical theme, the decision maker
creates a story, a narrative, describing the conflict. To the constructed narrative, the decision maker adds his/her own interpretive theory. The purpose of the interpretive theory is to create an abstraction that separates the rhetorical theme from its
66
social context.
The result is that the rhetorical theme
achieves intellectual coherence and leads to the conclusion that
67
the status quo is tolerable, even natural and inevitable. In
this way, decision makers are able to avoid the real issue of oppression because the entire issue is recast to create an explanation of social reality from the perspective of the dominant
group.
Even when the issue is viewed from the "perpetrator['s]
68
perspective" where members of the dominant group are
characterized as the perpetrators, the abstraction of the theme
from the social context allows the decision-maker to develop a
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Ross, supra note 1, at 17.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 25.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 41.
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the social context allows the decision-maker to develop a narrative explaining why members of the dominant group are not responsible for the resulting oppression. If members of the dominant group are not responsible, then a remedy that would end
oppression for a subjugated group would unfairly victimize
members of the dominant group. Such a result makes sense
only as long as the social context is ignored. That is, the decision-maker selects certain details of the story to include in the
constructed narrative while omitting other details. The decision-maker carefully chooses those details to ensure that the
resulting narrative absolves the dominant group of responsibil. 69
1·ty fior ano th er group ' s oppressiOn.
This approach is being used in cases where students assert
Constitutional rights, expecting protection from the punitive
actions of school officials. This approach also ensures that we
can always pose the question, who is the real victim? The answer to that question will vary depending on how the interpretive narrative is constructed. The one who constructs the narrative, then, controls the outcome, regardless ofthe existence of
a socially constructed, "objective" truth.

VII. WHY WE NEED A CRITICAL THEORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Short of heaven, our law will always reflect our imperfect
moral worth. We will always possess stories about "the others," those we fear and despise, whoever they may be. And the
70
law will always embody those stories.

As Ross explains, law consists of something more than
merely a statement of the rules. Beyond the statutes and judicial opinions, the law incorporates "[t]he choices and actions of

69. The process begins when the judge identifies the rhetorical themes that will
be used to characterize the perpetrator as "other," and to create a new victim who is a
member of the dominant group. The judge, acting as storyteller, uses language to tell
the story of the event, describing the individuals involved, explaining the need for justice, and determining how justice will be defined. This results in a narrative that contains the constructed "truth" about the individual, the event, and the community where
the event occurred. The narrative establishes the intellectual coherence of the rhetorical theme and leads to the definition of the universal norm defining the boundaries of
acceptable behavior, appearance, etc. The universal norm also highlights differences
between people thereby creating insiders and outsider where difference is devalued. In
a system defined by universal norms, difference is defined as deviance, thus, justifying
punishment, in one form or another, for those who are different.
70. ld.
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the state's agents-police, prosecutors, judges, and juriesdetermine the victim's and the defendant's experience of the
71
law." Ultimately, the meaning of the law is determined in the
first instance by the state agent who is the first to encounter a
situation requiring application or interpretation of a law to a
particular event. It is up to the first state agent who encounters an event to determine if a rule or law has been violated.
And if it has, then that state agent determines how the state
72
will respond to that violation. The state agent, therefore, has
discretion to determine not only if a law has been violated, but
further, how the infraction should be characterized, and also if
the infraction should be prosecuted.
Applied in the public school setting, this means that a
school official (usually either a teacher or a school administrator, but it could be any school employee such as a custodian,
bus driver, school secretary, or the like) is the first state agent
to be required to determine what the rules and laws are, how
those rules and laws have been interpreted and applied in the
past, and how those rules and laws, and their interpretations
apply or don't apply to the situation at hand. While most school
officials strive to interpret laws in accordance with established
interpretations, initial enforcement decisions are made individually, often in isolation, and without a significant oversight
or review mechanism in place to determine if the accusation or
subsequent enforcement should have occurred in the first
place. Because school officials exercise "virtually unchecked
73
discretion," it is the school official who is the first to announce
to the public what the state's law is. This unchecked, initial
process provides fertile ground for abuse of discretion fueled, at
least in part, by individual, personal prejudices that may or
may not be acknowledged by the state official. This, Ross explains, means that the "law will always accommodate the separation and subjugation of those whom the powerful fear and
74
despise."
This process gives great power to the state agents furthest
removed from the judicial process entrusted to ensure fair and
appropriate treatment of accused offenders. It also gives great

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 1.
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power to state agents to selectively enforce rules or laws, and
this has the potential to institutionalize privileged treatment of
certain individuals at the expense of the powerless.

A. Language: Building Blocks of Righteousness
There are at least two things accomplished through the
careful selection of the language used to tell the story of the increase in school violence. First, language is being used by
judges to justify the need to treat juveniles harshly for a vari75
ety of behaviors. Second, language also is used to establish
76
the innocence of school personnel and other students. However, language also can be used to obscure or ignore the assumptions about and biases against those individuals identi77
fied as "other." Examples of the assumptions and biases of
courts have to do with the way adults in the school are charac78
terized. In Montalvo v. Madera USD Board of Education,
school administrators and personnel were described by the

75. "School officials are keen observers of student conduct, and they need to possess the ability to act quickly when they observe suspicious behavior signaling either
the imminent danger of, or the recent occurrence of, a discipline problem that could
disrupt the school environment." Pennsylvania v. Cass, 551 Pa. 25 (Pa. 1998). "Teachers and other school officials have significant and direct authority over impressionable
young people in school classrooms and corridors. They are paid by the state to determine what is taught and how it is taught. They wield the power to control, evaluate,
and discipline student behavior and performances." Sands v. Morongo Unified School
District, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 899 (Cal. 1991). "It is the duty of school administrators to enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the school system, the
students and the educational process in general." Bouse v. Hipes, 319 F. Supp. 515 (S.
D. Ind. 1970). School official/school district "assumes a duty to protect [students] from
dangers posed by anti-social activities-their own and those of other students-and to
provide them with an environment in which education is possible. To fulfill that duty,
teachers and school administrators must have broad supervisory and disciplinary powers." Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, at 982 (6th Cir. 1984), citing Horton v. Goose
Creek Independent School District, 690 F. 2d 470, at 480 (5th Cir. 1982).
76. "[T]eachers suffering serious injuries at the hands of violent students" "... a
teacher ordered an unruly student to her office and as a result, the teacher was viciously pushed against the wall breaking her pelvis." "... a teacher disciplined a student in the corridor; the student came back later with a knife and chain and attacked
the teacher." "The legislature sought to preserve a feeling of security in teachers from
would-be assaulters, ... and in the students and teachers, from armed attacks from the
especially violent who resort to knives, nun-chucks, firearms, and other implements
'capable of inflicting serious bodily injury."' In the Interest of D. S., 424 Pa. Super. 350,
370-72 (Pa. Super. 1993).
77. "[A]ppellant's history reflects numerous encounters with the law and a rejection of school discipline. State of Illinois v. Baxtrom, 81 Ill. App.3d 653, 659 (Ill. App.
1980).
78. 21 Cal. App.3d 323 (Cal. App. 1971).
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court as "professionally trained ... competent and dedicated
79
experts in the field of education."
Such language is designed to elevate school administrators
and school personnel to a higher moral level than those over
whom they have power. In so doing, courts cleverly begin the
process of justifying whatever action the school official took
80
making that action seem necessary under the circumstances.
Juveniles designated as "other" are described as "immature ...
1
excitable and prone to be distracted from their tasks."H Most
telling, though, is the language the court uses to ensure the rationality of a particular approach explained in its social context. For example, Judge Stone, dissenting in Montalvo, stated:
Such intrusions upon broadly defined constitutional
freedoms [of students] are essential when the welfare and
continued existence of society are weighed against the
freedom of the individual to do as he pleases. 82
In constructing the narrative of justification, rhetorical
themes are identified that characterize certain juveniles as
"other." Rhetorical themes also are identified that help the storyteller to create new, innocent victims of juvenile violence,
school officials (adults) and academically successful students.
The juvenile court judge fills the role of storyteller. Being removed from the social context where the event occurred,
namely the school, the judge is able to construct the narrative
of juvenile violence in schools through language that reflects
the values and moral worth of education reflected in numerous
court cases involving the rights of students against the school's
and society's interest in safety and education.
The language used by the juvenile court judge to construct
the narrative of the event, the individuals involved, the need
for justice, and how justice will be defined, is chosen carefully,
revealing the weight the storyteller gives to the interests of
each party. The weight of the words judges use in identifying
the evil creates the path the judge will follow in redeeming the
righteous. The judge's narrative yields a new, constructed truth
about juveniles in schools that maintains existing power struc79. !d. at 330.
80. "[H]air regulation is reasonable and rational and reasonably relates to ad
serves to enhance the educational function and the health and safety of the pupils of
said school district." !d. at 337.
81. !d. at 331.
82. !d. at 337.
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tures as well as the socially imposed powerlessness of juveniles
based on their status and age. The newly constructed "truth"
pertaining to the severity and frequency of juvenile violence in
public schools shields us from recognizing how the "truth"
about juvenile violence really was constructed and how that
"truth" embodies our current bias against certain juveniles.
B. Language: The Tool of Subjugation

On April 20, 1999, a terrible thing happened at Columbine
High School in Littleton, Colorado. Two high school boys took
vengeance on 14 students and one teacher, we learned in the
days following the shootings because they were angry at everyone at the school for ignoring them, for treating them as outsiders. And for a moment, everyone's attention was focused on
the two boys, the dead, Columbine High School, and Littleton,
Colorado.
At the outset, the media focused on the two boys who had
killed fellow students in an effort to understand why two seemingly usual teenaged boys would wreak the havoc we saw in
this latest major incident of school violence. It was the first
time, though, that there was a concerted effort to understand
what motivated those two boys to kill so many. For the first
couple of days, the media focused its attention on what makes
quiet, intelligent, young boys feel alienated from and invisible
to their peers and the adults at their school. We learned that
the boys were in crisis because no one was listening to them or
83
even saw the pain they tried to hide.
The focus on the two teen gunmen lasted a day or two, during which the media, politicians, talk show hosts, and the
President all concentrated on finding an explanation why those
two boys would have committed such carnage. In the initial aftermath, it seemed that we all knew the solution lay in understanding what could drive those two boys, as well as the preceding teen gunmen, to kill their peers and teachers. However,
by the third day after the Littleton, Colorado school killings,
the President, politicians, the media, and the public at large returned to the more familiar response to these events by turning
the conversation back to discovering who or what is to blame
for these increasingly violent and deadly outbursts by teenaged
83. WILLIAM POLLACK, REAL BOYS: RESCUING OUR SONS FROM TilE MYTHS OF
BOYHOOD (1998).
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boys.
Blame rather than responsibility took center stage on talk
shows and in the news. There was a renewed call for gun control and more stringent efforts to curb violence in movies as the
means of stopping the spread of teen violence. A more insidious component was added to the list of blameworthy. The gunmen themselves were blamed for the violence in Littleton. By
blaming the gunmen, we were told that school officials were not
responsible for the tragedy because school officials could not
have known this incident would happen. They could have not
have foreseen that the two boys in Littleton, Colorado would
act out violently against their peers. But the question remains
whether or not school officials really can escape all responsibility or blame for the teen violence that results from the isolation
some boys feel that is nurtured within schools where certain
students are ignored because they are not athletes; they are
not popular; they are not noticed by anyone. In the aftermath
of Littleton, William Pollack has received national attention for
his book, Real Boys: Rescuing Our Sons From the Myths of
Boyhood. In an interview on CNN the day after the Littleton
shootings, Dr. Pollack stated that there is a "national crisis of
boys in America that we do not talk about, we don't reach out
84
to them, they are invisible." Further, Dr. Pollack stated that
"we talk about violence in general ... we don't talk about the
violence in boys."H" Some boys feel ostracized by their peers as
well as the adults around them at school. Those boys come together, in some cases, as "a group of outcasts and they take
86
vengeance on the world."
Pollack's message is clear. Some boys who have been labeled as outcasts by their peers and teachers feel isolated and
increasingly angry. At some point, in some boys, the anger boils
over into violence because those boys have not learned any
other way of expressing their feelings that is consistent with
the societal message that boys and men cannot show emotion
or acknowledge feelings of vulnerability. According to Pollack,
boys in America have been taught that to be stoic and strong
appropriately demonstrates acceptable male behavior. Unfortunately for some boys, this code of masculinity forces them to

84. Interview with William Pollack on CNN, April 21, 1999.
85. ld.
86. !d.
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internalize their feelings and emotions so that when their frustration and anger builds, the appropriate, socially-taught masculine response is to express that frustration and anger
through violence.
VIII. MAKING SCHOOLS SAFE FROM TEEN VIOLENCE

The school shootings in Littleton, Colorado have turned our
attention again toward understanding this increasingly frequent, recurrent tragedy. In the aftermath of the earlier school
shootings, we have searched for someone to blame. This latest
school shooting has generated discussion that includes consideration of the more personal, localized causes of teen violence
in addition to the broader social issues of gun control and violent movies.
Recently, the House Education Subcommittee on Schools
87
and Violence, heard testimony from Dr. Kingery, director of
the Hamilton Fish National Institute on School and Community Violence, who offered several approaches that have been
successful in curbing juvenile violence. Dr. Kingery testified
that alternative education programs alone are not sufficient to
address issues of juvenile violence. Such programs can be effective if offered in conjunction with services to the troubled teens.
The purpose of education, plus services, is to ensure that teens
prone to violence not only learn proper, nonviolent behavior,
but they also are taught "the small focused skills necessary to
88
change their behavior."
Representative Marge Roukema (NJ) stated that there is no
coordination between the juvenile justice system and the school
system. She suggests that everyone be brought into the system.
That is, the juvenile justice system must work with the mental
health department, schools, and the police in order to effectively address the issue of teen violence. When pushed to offer
an approach that works, Dr. Kingery told of a San Diego Juvenile Court judge who ordered inter-agency cooperation to facilitate the monitoring of juveniles and students. This example illustrates that an inter-agency approach leaves little room for a
juvenile to fall through the cracks because there are several
87. School and Community Violence, Before Early Childhood, Youth, and Families Subcommittee of the House Committee on Health, Education, and the Workforce.
106'" Congress (1999) (statement of Paul M. Kingery).
88. Id.
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agencies monitoring the juvenile rather than a single agency.
While many juveniles interact with several agencies, the difference in the San Diego example is that the Juvenile Court judge
oversees the whole process which provides the necessary attention to how each agency is progressing, thereby reducing the
likelihood that court ordered agency interventions will fall by
the wayside.
In addition to exploring new approaches to addressing juvenile violence, the House Subcommittee also heard testimony
from a parent, Lyle Welsh, of a student killed in a school shooting. Mr. Welsh contended that the solution begins at home. The
problem, according to Welsh, is that parents do not spend
enough time at home. Therefore, they are not fulfilling their re89
sponsibility of "teach[ing] respect for life and academics."
Welsh commented further that parents and schools "have to be
in unison. Schools must reinforce the home message," emphasizing "high academic performances." The climate has shifted
with regard to how we will proceed on the issue of teen violence
in schools. Littleton is the catalyst that has caused this recent
shift. While we still are concerned about easy access to guns
and the increased violence portrayed in the media, we have begun to ask more pertinent questions about the immediate
causes of teen violence. Rather than turning our focus outward,
we have begun to ask what role parents, teachers, schools, and
communities play in creating an environment where certain
teens feel there is no other option than to kill those who are
perceived as the cause of their isolation. That is where the real
solution lies. Only by understanding why some teens choose
violence as the solution to their pain will we, as a society, be
capable of resolving the growing incidence of school violence.

IX. CONCLUSION
School shootings will continue as long as we ignore the root
causes of the isolation some teens feel in their homes, at school,
and in their communities. As long as we continue to believe
that violent teens are different, therefore deviant, we can continue to believe that we are not to blame, at least in part, for
maintaining the social and legal structures that isolate and
punish those identified as "other." Juveniles will be subjected

89. Jd.
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to a system that mirrors an adult system that values social
norms and excludes or punishes individual difference. Because
the legal system and school systems ignore the perspectives of
those individuals who are different, we can expect some teens
to continue to act out violently in search of someone who will
listen to their calls for attention and understanding. If we do
not learn to decode the violence, we will continue to fall victim
to that violence. A critical theory of juvenile justice that incorporates the unique perspectives and experiences of juveniles
who enter the system is needed to salvage the majority of juveniles who find themselves reaching out for help in the only
ways they know - violence and illegal behavior.

